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OF MARYLAND FAVOR THE INJURED WORKER? 
Ronald J. Levasseur 
NO 
The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act was 
designed to "provide compensation to injured workers 
in accordance with a statutory plan for work related 
disabilities." Unfortunately, a contest has developed 
between the various parties both at the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission and in appeals in an effort to gain 
an advantage. The appellate courts of Maryland have 
long pronounced that uncertainties or conflicts regard-
ing questions of construction ofthe Workers' Compen-
sation Act should be resolved in favor of the claimant. 1 
At first glance, it would appear that the claimant is given 
great advantage under the law. However, in the reality 
of representing injured workers before the Workers' 
Compensation Commission, what you see is not always 
what you get. 
It is easy to point to excerpts of statutory language 
and isolated judicial decisions and conclude that the 
injured worker is the true beneficiary of our State's 
workers' compensation system. However, the vast 
majority of workers 'compensation claims are resolved 
at the Commission level. At this stage, the employer or 
insurer, rather than the claimant, gains a great deal of 
control over the process of deciding workers' compen-
sation claims, inevitably sacrificing the well-being of 
both the injured worker and the overall system. 
There are four main areas where the law, not as it is 
written but as it is applied, serves to deter any true 
chance that the injured worker has to receive benefits 
commensurate with his disability, including an effective 
retraining and rehabilitation program that will enable 
him to re-enter the job market at a level reasonably 
coordinate with his previous employment. 
Vocational Rehabilitation 
The vocational rehabilitation section of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act is set forth in the Labor and 
Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Mary-
land.2 The purpose of providing vocational rehabilita-
tion to an injured worker is "to return the disabled 
covered employee to suitable gainful employment."3 
Unfortunately, the interdependence between vocation-
al rehabilitation providers and insurance companies is 
much too close, requiring vocational experts to rely 
upon insurance company representatives to approve or 
disapprove their recommendations.4 
When the Workers' Compensation Commission 
finds that an injured worker is entitled to vocational 
rehabilitation, it refers that employee to a vocational 
rehabilitation provider. The employer or insurer must 
pay the expenses associated with the vocational rehabil-
itation of its covered employee. 5 On its face, vocational 
rehabilitation looks to be a real boon to the claimant -
- an opportunity to develop his body and mind to obtain 
maximum employability. But appearances are deceiv-
ing under our workers' compensation system. 
The fact that the employer or insurer controls the 
payment for rehabilitation services provided to the 
claimant essentially serves to shift the focus of the 
vocational rehabilitation provider from the injured 
worker to the employerlinsurer. Natural economic self-
interests make it obvious that the true client of vocation-
al rehabilitation providers is the employer/insurer who 
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al rehabilitation providers is the employer/insurer who 
pays the bills. This close relationship is further facilitat-
ed by the inescapable nature of the employer/insurer's 
involvement in the vocational rehabilitation system. 
Vocational rehabilitation providers rely upon employ-
er/insurers to provide a steady stream of clients. This 
reliance is gradually transformed into subservience and, 
as "the customer is always right," the wishes of the 
employer/insurer take precedence over the best inter-
ests of the injured worker. 
The law allows the employer/insurer to select and 
exert de facto control over the vocational rehabilitation 
provider and the rehabilitation program in general. 
Employer/insurers are economic entities primarily con-
cerned with the bottom line and, as such, coerce voca-
tional rehabilitation providers to follow the cheapest 
program possible. In an overwhelming majority of 
cases, this results in low cost "job searches" for the 
worker, frequently frustrating the intended vocational 
rehabilitation purpose. Too often, the worker is placed 
in situations where he is not comfortable and does not 
have the training needed to obtain a position that will 
compensate him anywhere near his previous salary. 
The facts of the situation are thus: the employer/ 
insurer has undue influence over the vocational rehabil-
itation provider. Rather than provide costly but effec-
tive skills retraining programs or educational opportu-
nities, the least expensi ve means possi ble are utilized to 
get the worker a low-paying, low-skilled job. This aids 
the employer/insurer's goal of minimizing the cost of 
workers' compensation but does nothing to advance 
the desires of the claimant or the statutory intent of the 
system. As long as the law is interpreted as not requiring 
the independence of vocational rehabilitation provid-
ers, and input from both sides in vocational rehabilita-
tion decisions is not solicited, the vocational rehabilita-
tion component of the workers' compensation system 
will continue to be subtly wielded to the advantage of 
employers and insurers. 
Permanent Partial Disability 
On January 1, 1988, Maryland introduced a three-
tier structure for the classification of permanently par-
tially disabled workers. The law applies to incidents that 
occur after January 1, 1988 and creates a minor disabil-
i ty section.6 This section reduces the amount of awards 
for disabilities of less than 75 weeks duration to 33 11 
3% of the average weekly wage.7 Awards of75 weeks 
remain unchanged at 66 2/3% of the average weekly 
wage.8 The tri-part disability system ties the level of 
benefits that the injured worker is eligible to receive to 
impairment ratings given by physicians. Usually, the 
employer/insurer and the claimant produce impairment 
ratings by different physicians. Obviously, each physi-
cian has some degree of allegiance to the best interests 
ofthe party who is the actual client, again out of normal 
economic self-interest. 
The three-tier plan, designed to decrease the overall 
costs and delays inherent in administering the workers' 
compensation system, has resulted only in cutting costs 
for the employer/insurer. The added third tier, intended 
for less serious inj uries, enables the employer/insurer to 
pay minimal benefits to the injured worker. How this 
adaption of workers' compensation law can be thought 
in any way to aid the cause of claimants is beyond the 
pale of common sense. The employer/insurer manipu-
lates the system and contains costs by, explicitly or 
implicitly, directing physicians to place the impairment 
ratings within the lowest possible tier of benefits. An 
impairment rating which is only slightly less than that 
given by a claimant's treating physician can result in the 
denial of thousands of dollars in benefits to which the 
injured worker would otherwise be entitled. 
While this aspect ofthe three-tier structure by itself 
is sufficiently contrary to the intent of the workers' 
compensation law, the repercussions to the system 
caused by the employer/insurer's use of the three-tier 
advantages is even more troubling. StipUlations have 
become increasingly difficult to negotiate due to the fact 
that the employer/insurer generally will not agree to any 
stipulation that would push benefit entitlements into a 
higher tier. As such, even minor discrepancies between 
physicians' impairment ratings are forced before the 
Commission for it to determine into which tier a claim 
should be placed. This, of course, clogs the system and 
creates longer waits for hearings in all categories, 
including temporary total disability payments, medical 
bill payments, and other areas to which the three-tier 
system is inapplicable. 
A recent study by the National Council on Compen-
sation Insurance (NCCI) reports that 61 % of perm a-
nent partial disability claims involve contested impair-
ment rating determinations. 9 This same study noted that 
in Maryland, an injured worker waits a median of fifty 
days before receiving any workers' compensation pay-
ments, almost twice the median waiting period in twelve 
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other states reviewed by the NCC!. Further, 91 % of 
workers' compensation claimants surveyed in the study 
found it necessary to retain counsel to assist them in 
receiving benefits. Worse, the expanding number of 
cases forced to be litigated on appeal to the circuit 
courts, with the attendant costs to the claimant, are not 
even factored into the study. 10 It is foolhardy to suggest 
that these alarming numbers, in a system supposedly 
geared to assisting the injured worker quickly and 
efficiently, are not interrelated and that the three-tier 
system is not a root cause ofthe delays and difficulties. 
It is the claimant who truly suffers under this 
burden. It is the injured worker's bills that are not paid, 
children's educations that are forced to suffer, and self-
esteem that is left to flounder due to interminable 
delays. These are the true victims of a system that has 
gradually been transformed from a system which fa-
vored the injured worker at all stages into one which 
provides only statutory "lip service" to the injured 
worker while functionally serving as a "silent partner" 
of the employer/insurer. 
Impairment Ratings and Medical Evidence 
By law, the Commission has the power to regulate 
expenses for medical services rendered to claimants. II 
This regulatory power extends to the costs associated 
with the claimant obtaining medical evaluations for the 
purpose of determining impairment ratings and pre-
senting medical evidence to verify his physical capabil-
ities. The theory behind this extensive regulation is that 
the injured worker should be protected from having the 
great bulk of his compensation award eaten up by 
medical or legal expenses. 
The rationale behind the regulation fades, howev-
er, in the arena of the employer/insurer's medical 
evaluation costs. The employer/insurer is free to 
engage multiple physicians and pay any fee required in 
seeking medical evaluations, since these expenses are 
not thought to directly diminish the amount of compen-
sation that the injured worker may receive. While the 
impact of the employer/insurer's unlimited medical 
evaluation "war chest" on claimants' awards may not 
be direct, the incongruous results that it produces are 
substantial. 
An injured worker is limited in both the number and 
the cost of physicians by whom he can be evaluated. 
Thus, in many cases, he is unable to obtain the best 
medical advice possible or to seek suggested, yet 
costly, treatment in serious injury cases. The employer/ 
insurer has no such hurdles in presenting medical evi-
dence to the Commission regarding its view of the 
claimant's physical impairment and work capabilities. 
Imagine this inequity in other fields oflaw. It is difficult 
to fathom a system where one party in a dispute, whether 
it be contractual, domestic, product liability, etc., is 
capped by the fact finder and system administrator in the 
amount he can spend for expert evidence and opinions, 
while the other party is given carte blanche to buy as 
many expert opinions as possible in order to overwhelm 
the opponent, controlling the content of these opinions 
with an ample checkbook. 
The role that medical evaluation and opinion play in 
the workers' compensation process cannot be underes-
timated. When the Commission determines the amount 
of benefits to which a claimant is entitled in a permanent 
partial disability case, it relies upon the impairment 
ratings offered by the claimant's physician and the 
physicians retained by the employer/insurer. Similarly, 
medical opinions as to causation, tenure and extent, 
medical improvement, and future work capabilities all 
weigh heavily on almost every Commission decision. 
The employer/insurer, by virtue of its unlimited access to 
medical diagnosis, has a precipitous advantage over the 
claimant when contesting any of these issues before the 
Commission. The Commission's adoption of one par-
ty's medical opinions can mean thousands of dollars in 
benefits to the injured worker. That the worker, the 
"beneficiary" of the workers' compensation system, 
should not be allowed to seek these opinions on an even 
basis seems fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with 
overall statutory intent. 
Recently, the Mary land General Assembly attempt-
ed to place the employer/insurer and the claimant on 
more even ground when seeking medical evaluations 
and diagnosis. House Bill 3 70, proposed in 1994, would 
have expressly granted the Commission regulatory pow-
er over fees and charges for medical evaluations incurred 
by the employer/insurer. In the face of heavy industry 
opposition, HB 370 was unsuccessful, providing anoth-
er example of why the Workers' Compensation Act has 
evol ved into a tool of the employer/insurer rather than a 
safety net for the injured worker. 
Failure to Timely Pay for Medical Bills and Services 
By law, the employer/insureris obligated to prompt-
ly pay medical bills and services required by an injured 
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worker. 12 The law also imposes penalties for non-
payment of medical bills within a prescribed time if set 
forth in an Order of the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission. I3 However, a hearing must be held for the 
claimantto obtain such an Order. Non-payment causes 
physical as well as emotional harm to the injured 
worker. Health care providers often pursue payments 
directly from the injured worker, in some instances 
filing law suits against the worker while he awaits a 
hearing before the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion attempting to obtain an Order. 
A simple solution was offered before the 1994 
General Assembly in House Bill 371. House Bill 371 
would have set a specific time limit for either payment 
of medical bills or filing issues giving a reason for denial 
within 45 days. Unfortunately, HB 371 was also 
defeated in the Assembly after lobbying by insurance 
and business interests. 
Conclusion 
The employer/insurer has gained vast practical ad-
vantages over the injured worker when contesting 
workers' compensation claims. While the ostensible 
goal of the system is to provide workers with virtually 
"no fault" recovery on a rapid basis and return these 
casualties of industry to the job force in an efficient and 
productive manner, the unspoken goal has incremental-
ly shifted to minimizing employer/insurer costs, regard-
less of the effect this may have on the claimant. The 
employerlinsurers' financial superiority allows them to 
wield excessive influence over the medical and rehabil-
itation service providers so vital to the workers' com-
pensation system. Their bargaining advantages force 
claimants, who wait inexcusably long periods to receive 
just compensation, to either return to work when 
physically incapable, accept less benefits than to which 
they may be entitled, or face financial and personal ruin. 
The Workers' Compensation Act favors the injured 
worker in theory. It is the practice of workers' compen-
sation that the employer/insurer has come to control. 
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